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attempts to rationalise the decision in a reasonably broad manner, but it remains to
be seen whether subsequent case law will interpret Glasgow City Council narrowly
or in the spirit of the Commissioner’s advice.26 Arguably a narrower interpretation is
technically correct, though functionally unpalatable. It seems likely that this issue will
be revisited in the Supreme Court at some point in the not too distant future.
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How Do You Solve a Problem Like Entrapment?
Jones and Doyle v HM Advocate
The issue of how a claim of entrapment should be dealt with by the criminal courts
has divided the international legal community, with different jurisdictions regarding
it as a substantive defence,1 a matter that should lead to a stay in proceedings2 or
a matter that should lead to the exclusion of the evidence obtained.3 Traditionally,
Scots law has dealt with the issue as one of exclusion of evidence4 but in Brown v
HM Advocate, decided in 2002,5 it was suggested that the correct approach was to
stay proceedings to preserve the moral integrity of the court system.6 The comments
made in that case were obiter, as there was no evidence from which entrapment
could properly have been inferred.7 In Jones and Doyle v HM Advocate,8 however,
the issue arose squarely for decision and a majority of the appeal court held that a stay
in proceedings is the preferable approach, notwithstanding a strongly argued dissent
from Lord Carloway, who considered that precedent prevented any approach other
than the exclusion of evidence.
26 There is evidence that the Scottish Government considered the decision a justification to resist
multiple disclosures: Scottish Information Commissioner, Freedom of Information Annual Report 2009
(2010) 2.
1 As in the federal jurisdiction of the US (Sorrells v United States 287 US 435 (1932)).
2 As in England and Wales (R v Looseley [2001] UKHL 53, [2001] 1 WLR 2060) and Canada (R v Mack
[1988] 2 SCR 903).
3 As in Australia (Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19), New Zealand (Police v Lavalle [1979] 1
NZLR 45) and Singapore (Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2007] SGHC 207).
4 Marsh v Johnston 1959 SLT (Notes) 28; Cook v Skinner, MacDonald v Skinner 1977 JC 9;Weir v Jessop
1991 JC 146.
5 2002 SLT 809.
6 This rationale is most clearly visible in Brown at para 2 per Lord Clarke.
7 Brown at para 8 per Lord Marnoch.
8 [2009] HCJAC 86, 2010 GWD 20-391.
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A. FACTS AND OUTCOME
Jones and Doyle arose out of the theft of Da Vinci’s Madonna of the Yarnwinder.
Various people (including the appellants) were alleged to have entered into a
conspiracy in 2007 to extort money for the safe return of the painting. After the
conspirators had aroused suspicion, undercover police officers became involved
and – so the appellants claimed – “actively encouraged”9 them to partake in a
subsequent offence of reset. The appellants cited entrapment in relation to the reset
charges and asked for proceedings to be stayed on the ground of oppression. The
trial judge refused this motion. On appeal, it was held unanimously that entrapment
had not been established and the appellants’ motion for a stay of proceedings
was thus denied. In the event, when the case went to trial, none of the accused
was convicted. The case is of considerable importance, however, because the court
took the opportunity to discuss various elements of the plea of entrapment, most
importantly the procedure by which claims of entrapment should be determined.
B. THE MAJORITY’S APPROACH: STAYING PROCEEDINGS
Lords Reed and Menzies agreed that the appropriate response to entrapment is a
stay of proceedings. There remained the question of the means by which this ought
to be accomplished. In Brown, Lord Marnoch thought that entrapment should stay
proceedings because it was a form of oppression (but admitted that it could also be
seen as an abuse of process),10 whilst Lords Philip11 and Clarke12 viewed it as an abuse
of process. As Lord Reed pointed out in Jones and Doyle, this distinction matters
little in practice13 because the result is the same – i.e. the ending of the proceedings.
Nevertheless, his Lordship and Lord Menzies sought to resolve the uncertainty.
Both judges thought that entrapment should afford a plea in bar of trial based
on oppression. This was because the term “abuse of process” tends to connote
that the courts are being utilised by a litigant in a way for which they were not
designed.14 An entrapped accused is brought to trial in order for the Crown to
prove that she (voluntarily) committed the actus reus with the requisite mens rea
and this is – according to Lord Reed15 – the proper purpose for the courts. It would
therefore be a misnomer to refer to the prosecution of an entrapped accused as an
“abuse of process”.16 Their Lordships preferred to rely on the plea in bar of trial
based on oppression as it is “sufficiently wide and flexible”17 so as to encompass
entrapment.
9 Jones and Doyle at para 51.
10 Brown at para 12.
11 Para 14.
12 Paras 2-3.
13 Jones and Doyle at para 34.
14 Para 35 per Lord Reed. For discussion of abuse of process in Scots law, see J Chalmers and F Leverick,
Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006) ch 19.
15 Para 36.
16 Para 86.
17 Para 37 per Lord Reed.
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There are two main problems with this approach, one legal and one concerned
with the understanding of oppression in everyday speech. The legal difficulty is that
oppression has usually relied on the concept of prejudice at trial, and yet entrapment
cases might, procedurally, be adjudicated in an impeccably fair way. Indeed, the
leading case on oppression, Stuurman v HM Advocate18 (which involved pre-trial
publicity), might be thought to limit oppression to cases of prejudice, given the
headnote in the Justiciary Cases report of the case.19 This, however, is inaccurate:20
the operative part of the Stuurman test is whether “having regard to the principles
of substantial justice and of fair trial, to require an accused to face trial would
be oppressive”.21 In Jones and Doyle, Lord Reed interpreted this as requiring
prosecutions to conform to “accepted standards of justice” and held that “[a] trial
based on entrapment would not conform to those standards”.22
The second difficulty follows from Lord Reed’s argument that the trial of an
entrapped accused is “plainly oppressive as a matter of ordinary language”.23 Consider
the definitions given in the Oxford English Dictionary: abuse “is the improper use
of something”; to oppress is to “keep in subjection or hardship” or to “cause to
feel distressed or anxious”. Neither term seems to capture the vice of entrapment
exactly, namely that the state has manufactured a case for the purposes of (mis)using
the court’s powers to convict a citizen who would not otherwise have committed an
offence. This seems to be both oppressive and an abuse of the court system. It is
oppressive because the accused is essentially being used by the state as a means to an
end (conviction). It is an abuse because the purpose of the criminal trial can be seen
as more than simply determining whether the accused committed an actus reus with
the appropriate mens rea. That is merely its instrumental role. It also fulfils a more
normative, communicative role,24 through establishing whether the accused acted in
such a way that her conduct deserves to be authoritatively disavowed by society.25
This communicative element can only be present in regard to those who have not
been induced into committing an offence in order for the state to prosecute them. It
is, therefore, misusing the court process to try an entrapped accused.
C. LORD CARLOWAY’S DISSENT: EXCLUDING EVIDENCE
Lord Carloway shared the other judges’ concerns about the abuse of executive
power, but disagreed about how to deal with it. In the authorities prior to Brown,
18 1980 JC 111.
19 Which states (at 112) that the court held that “oppression occurs only when the risk of prejudice to the
accused is so grave that no direction of the trial Judge could reasonably be expected to remove it”.
20 Chalmers & Leverick, Criminal Defences (n 14) para 19.02.
21 Stuurman at 122 per the Lord Justice-General (Emslie). Cf Mitchell v HM Advocate 2003 JC 89.
22 Para 37. See also para 96 per Lord Menzies.
23 Para 37.
24 This thesis has been developed most fully by Antony Duff (see, for instance, R A Duff, Punishment,
Crime and Community (2000)) and forms the backbone of R A Duff et al, The Trial on Trial:
Volume 3 – Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (2007).
25 Cf Jones and Doyle at para 36 per Lord Reed, para 86 per Lord Carloway.
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entrapment was dealt with by excluding evidence.26 It is these cases on which Lord
Carloway premised his argument against a plea in bar of trial. His Lordship contended
that:27
[N]either the speeches in R v Looseley . . . however persuasive or illuminating, nor the obiter
dicta in Brown v HM Advocate . . . can overturn established Scottish precedent. The Court
ought to have firmly in mind its own principle of stare decisis. In deciding a particular case,
the Court ought not to introduce new laws or procedures, where these are in conflict with
existing law and procedure, even if it considers that, from a theoretical perspective, they
constitute an improvement on the established situation.
Thus the appropriate procedure, in Lord Carloway’s view, was to raise an objection to
the relevant evidence.28
This is a remarkable volte face from the position adopted by the court in Brown
and, with respect, Lord Carloway’s own opinion in the case of HM Advocate v
Bowie.29 Furthermore, the other judges in Jones and Doyle were correct in their
observations that nothing in the earlier decisions to which Lord Carloway referred
precludes a stay of proceedings being the appropriate remedy for entrapment.30 As
Lord Menzies pointed out, the focus on irregularly obtained evidence arose largely
because of the way that those cases were argued before the court.31
Furthermore, Lord Carloway seems to accept, in the quote above, that a stay of
proceedings is the more theoretically viable approach to entrapment. The reason for
this is that an exclusionary rule misses the point of why entrapment is troubling. In
irregularly-obtained evidence cases, the objection is to the means by which some or all
of the evidence was obtained. To admit this evidence would offend the community’s
sense of fairness and damage the reputation of the criminal justice system.32 But
other evidence of the accused’s wrongdoing, which the state has obtained in a
procedurally correct manner, is not liable to endanger public confidence in the moral
legitimacy of the courts’ decision-making. Ending the proceedings altogether in such
circumstances would be wholly inappropriate and just as likely to damage confidence
in the administration of criminal justice as convicting the accused on the basis of, for
example, evidence from a warrantless search conducted in the absence of urgency.
By contrast, in entrapment cases, it is not the way in which the state seeks to call the
accused to answer to the courts which is of concern.33 Rather it is the very fact of the
26 See the cases cited at n 4 above.
27 Para 75.
28 Para 84.
29 2004 SCCR 105 at 110.
30 Para 33 per Lord Reed, para 95 per Lord Menzies.
31 Para 95.
32 For an argument to this effect, see P Duff, “Admissibility of improperly obtained physical
evidence in the Scottish criminal trial: the search for principle” (2004) 8 EdinLR 152 at
171-176.
33 For a view that criminal responsibility is a form of answerability, see R A Duff, Answering for Crime:
Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (2007) 15.
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accused being called to account at all.34 In order to avoid lending the court’s “stamp
of approval”, a stay of proceedings is thus necessitated.35
Furthermore, there is a danger that – if other evidence is available – the accused
might ultimately be convicted of an offence that (but for the state’s involvement) she
would never have committed. A stay of proceedings avoids the possibility that she is
convicted in circumstances which would offend the sensibilities of the community in
whose name criminal convictions are imposed.
D. THE TEST TO BE APPLIED
Despite the differences of opinion in relation to procedure, the court was in
agreement on the appropriate test to be applied in determining whether or not
entrapment has taken place. As Lord Carloway put it, “[w]hat the Court is looking
to see . . . is simply whether or not an unfair trick was played upon the particular
accused whereby he was deceived, pressured, encouraged or induced into committing
an offence which he would never otherwise have committed”.36 In applying this test,
the court should look to the guidance given by the House of Lords in R v Looseley
and by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Mack.37 As such, two factors must be
considered. First, consideration should be given to whether the police caused or
induced the offence or merely provided an “unexceptional opportunity”.38 Second, it
is relevant whether or not the police operation was conducted “in good faith”.39 This
can be established either by a reasonable suspicion that the particular accused was
likely to commit the offence in question (or one similar in nature)40 or by a finding
that the police were “acting in the course of a bona fide investigation of offences
similar to that with which the accused has been charged”.41
E. WHERE NOW?
Jones and Doyle provides answers to a number of important questions, both in
relation to entrapment and to pleas in bar of trial more generally. First, it can now
be stated with far more certainty than previously that entrapment is a plea in bar of
trial and not a matter relating to the exclusion of evidence. In this, the court is surely
correct. A claim of entrapment is not merely a claim that evidence has been gathered
34 Para 10 per Lord Reed. See also paras 14 and 31 and similarly, Duff, Answering for Crime (n 33) 190.
35 Lord Reed accepted the reasoning of Lamer J in R v Mack [1988] 2 SCR 903 at para 81.
36 Para 88. See also Lord Reed at paras 41, 48.
37 Para 38 per Lord Reed, citing Looseley (n 2) and Mack (n 2).
38 Looseley at para 23 per Lord Nicholls. See also para 50 per Lord Hoffmann, and Mack at
para 130.
39 Looseley at para 27 per Lord Nicholls.
40 Mack at para 130.
41 Looseley at para 100 per Lord Hutton (citing Ridgeway (n 3) at 92 per McHugh J). See also Mack
at para 130. For further discussion of these two factors and the guidance in Looseley and Mack more
generally, see Chalmers & Leverick, Criminal Defences (n 14) paras 20.18-20.22.
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inappropriately; it is a claim that the moral integrity of the criminal justice process
would be compromised if the prosecution went ahead because the state effectively
created the crime in order to prosecute it.
Secondly, while it was held that treating entrapment as a plea in bar of trial is the
preferable approach, it appears that the exclusionary approach is still competent.42
This conclusion is disappointing. As the majority argued, treating entrapment as an
issue of exclusion of evidence is “inherently unsatisfactory”43 for the reasons discussed
above. Equally, it is unhelpful and potentially inefficient, because it allows the accused
to argue the same point in two different ways and, conceivably, at two different points
during the same proceedings.
Thirdly, the test to be applied in determining whether or not entrapment has
occurred is whether or not the accused was induced to commit an offence he would
not otherwise have committed.
Fourthly, pleas of private entrapment – in other words, entrapment by someone,
such as an investigative journalist, who is not a police officer or state official – will not
be entertained. Given that entrapment was viewed by the majority as a plea in bar of
trial based on improper state conduct (“the essential vice of entrapment is the creation
of crime by the state for the purpose of prosecuting it”)44, it is clear that only state
entrapment can act as such.45 Here, the court is again surely correct. Absent state
involvement, the fact that individuals are persuaded (rather than coerced) to engage
in criminal activity by another is not a good reason to absolve them of responsibility.46
Finally, as a more general point, it now seems that a plea in bar of trial based
on oppression can be successful even if there is no possibility that the accused will
suffer prejudice at trial. The plea of oppression is not restricted to matters which
would render the trial unfair, such as prejudicial publicity or delay. As such, it serves
a similar function in Scots law to the plea of abuse of process in English law, in that
it extends to all cases in which it would offend against the legitimacy of the judicial
process to hold a trial at all.47 This, it would seem, leaves little room for a separate
claim of abuse of process.
Fiona Leverick
University of Glasgow
Findlay Stark
42 See Jones and Doyle at para 33 per Lord Reed, para 95 per Lord Menzies.
43 Para 31 per Lord Reed.
44 Para 30 per Lord Reed.
45 See para 12 per Lord Reed. For further discussion of private entrapment, see Chalmers & Leverick,
Criminal Defences (n 14) paras 20.27-20.29; K Hofmeyr, “The problem of private entrapment” [2006]
Crim LR 319.
46 On this, see A Ashworth, “Re-drawing the boundaries of entrapment” [2002] Crim LR 161
at 176.
47 With the exception of breach of a promise not to prosecute, which is dealt with as an abuse of process
in English law but which is recognised in its own right as a plea in bar of trial in Scotland: see Chalmers
& Leverick, Criminal Defences (n 14) ch 17.
